{"id":2107,"date":"2023-05-04T19:25:15","date_gmt":"2023-05-04T17:25:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.spacesecurity.info\/solarium-csc-2-0-has-endorsed-designation-of-space-systems-as-a-critical-infrastructure-sector\/"},"modified":"2023-05-04T19:34:19","modified_gmt":"2023-05-04T17:34:19","slug":"solarium-csc-2-0-has-endorsed-designation-of-space-systems-as-a-critical-infrastructure-sector","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.spacesecurity.info\/en\/solarium-csc-2-0-has-endorsed-designation-of-space-systems-as-a-critical-infrastructure-sector\/","title":{"rendered":"Solarium CSC 2.0 has endorsed designation of space systems as a critical infrastructure sector"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) was established<\/a> in the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 to “develop a consensus on a strategic approach to defending the United States in cyberspace against cyber attacks of significant consequences.” The finished report was presented to the public on March 11, 2020. The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 reauthorized<\/a> the Commission to collect and assess feedback on the analysis and recommendations contained within the final report, review the implementation of the recommendations contained within the final report, and completing the activities originally set forth for the Commission.<\/p>\n

Today, the Cybersecurity Solarium Commission (Solarium CSC 2.0) has endorsed designation of space systems as a critical infrastructure sector.<\/p>\n

Time to Designate Space Systems as Critical Infrastructure<\/h2>\n

America\u2019s adversaries recognize the importance of space systems to U.S. national security and economic prosperity and have tested capabilities to destroy them.<\/p>\n

Find below the\u00a0Executive Summary of the report<\/h2>\n

You can access to the Executive Summary of the report here<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe\u2019re in a space race\u201d with China, NASA Administrator Bill Nelson warned in December. The nature of that race is different from the Cold War contest with the Soviet Union that America fought and won. The national security components of the space race today include not just weapons systems but also the security of critical infrastructure \u2014 much of which relies on global positioning satellites, remote imagery, and advanced communication. The economic aspect is just as striking. The Space Foundation, a nonprofit advocacy group, has determined that the global space industry generated $469 billion in revenue in 2021. This number will only increase with technological and manufacturing innovation.<\/em><\/p>\n

More than a decade ago, the U.S. National Security Space Strategy warned that space will become more \u201ccongested, contested, and competitive.\u201d This warning proved prescient, but the U.S. government has not done enough to adapt to that reality. Major portions of American space systems are still not designated as critical infrastructure and do not receive the attention or resources such a designation would entail. The majority of today\u2019s space systems were developed under the premise that space was a sanctuary from conflict, but this is no longer the case. The threat from Russia and China is growing. Both those authoritarian powers have placed American and partner space systems in their crosshairs, as demonstrated by their testing of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. The United States needs a more concerted and coherent approach to risk management and public-private collaboration regarding space systems infrastructure.<\/em><\/p>\n

After interviewing more than 30 industry and government experts, the authors have concluded that designating space systems as a U.S. critical infrastructure sector would close current gaps and signal both at home and abroad that space security and resilience is a top priority. In 2013, Presidential Policy Directive-21 (PPD-21) designated 16 critical infrastructure sectors \u201cso vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.\u201d Space systems clearly meet this threshold.<\/em><\/p>\n

The term \u201cspace systems\u201d encompasses the ecosystem from ground to orbit, including sensors and signals, data and payloads, and critical technologies and supply chains. (See Figure 1.) This terminology (which sidesteps the conceptual debates about whether \u201cspace\u201d is an infrastructure or only a domain) aligns with presidential Space Policy Directive-5 (SPD-5) of September 2020, which defines space systems to include ground systems, sensor networks, and space vehicles. SPD-5 provided a set of voluntary best practices \u201cto guide and serve as the foundation for the United States Government approach to the cyber protection of space systems.\u201d This report seeks to build on these efforts, which constituted an important step toward recognizing and addressing the implications of the nexus between the cyber and space domains.<\/em><\/p>\n

Protecting space systems will require an enhanced model of public-private partnership with genuinely shared risk management responsibilities. On the government side, the agency that serves as lead sector risk management agency (SRMA) for this sector will have a demanding task \u2014 but one that NASA is well suited to fulfill so long as it receives the extra resources necessary to develop its capacity to protect national security, civil, and commercial systems. There will need to be subgroups within the sector that maintain relationships with other government agencies. One subgroup should deal with defense and intelligence systems, and another with communications systems already regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). But no alternative candidate for lead SRMA possesses the same range of requisite capabilities as NASA.<\/em><\/p>\n

Fostering security and resilience in the space systems sector will require mitigating unique cybersecurity challenges that stem from the geographic and technological particularities of space, as well as new and emerging space-based missions. Substantial investment through congressional appropriation will be imperative because policy without resources is merely rhetoric.<\/em><\/p>\n

This report does some recommendations for Congress<\/h2>\n

Recommendation 1<\/strong>: Designate space systems as a critical infrastructure sector.<\/p>\n