Attacks on OT (Operational Technology) systems are made easier due to the OT/IT convergence.
The figure below is showing an example of OT/IT convergence.
Attacks on OT and ICS systems are modeled by the ICS Cyber Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix described below.
ICS Cyber Kill Chain
Published by SANS in 2015 by Michael Assante and Robert M. Lee as an adaptation of the traditional cyber kill chain developed by Lockheed Martin analysts as it applied to ICSs.
The ICS Cyber Kill Chain details the steps an adversary must follow to perform a high‐confidence attack on the ICS process and/or cause physical damage to equipment in a predictable and controllable way.
ICS Cyber Kill Chain has Two stages:
Stage 1 : Cyber Intrusion Preparation and Execution – « IT »
Stage 2 : ICS Attack Developpement and Execution – « OT »
ICS Cyber Kill Chain mapped to the ICS Zoned Architecture
ICS Zoned Architecture (left) : This is the Purdue Model for ICS Security
Cyber Kill Chain for Industrial Control Systems (right) : This is an ICS Attack as Cascading Events
The ICS Cyber Kill Chain is a powerful approach for Neutralizing a Cyber Attack reducing ICS cyber risk. Security Engineering has the challenge to Kill the Kill Chain
ICS Cyber Kill Chain applied to STUXNET
The figure below is the ICS Cyber Kill Chain applied to STUXNET
About the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix
To go futhermore convergence of IT and OT, and the concept of ICS (Industrial Control System), you can also have a look on the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix.
The MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix is an overview of the tactics and techniques described in the ATT&CK for ICS knowledge base. It visually aligns individual techniques under the tactics in which they can be applied.
The MITRE ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Source: https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Main_Page)
Mapping of Stuxnet attack on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix
Below is the mapping of Stuxnet attack on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Than’ks to Airbus Cybersecurity). « Mapping Stuxnet to the ATT&CK for ICS matrix, as shown in figure 3, quickly shows how complex this attack was. Business risk owners can now identify which techniques to focus on if they need to minimise the risk from strikes like Stuxnet. »
Mapping of Stuxnet on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Source: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/mitre-attck-for-ics-everything-you-need-to-know/)
EMB3D is aligned with and expands on several existing models, including Common Weakness Enumeration, MITRE ATT&CK®, and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, but with a specific embedded-device focus. The threats defined within EMB3D are based on observation of use by threat actors, proof-of-concept and theoretical/conceptual security research publications, and device vulnerability and weakness reports. These threats are mapped to device properties to help users develop and tailor accurate threat models for specific embedded devices.
The videos from the Def Con 32 conference held in Las Vegas from August 8th to 11th are now online. Perfect for keeping busy during the long winter evenings ahead.
I have made a small selection of hashtag#cybersecurity topics on Space and Satellites.
Enjoy watching!
Small Satellite Modeling and Defender Software – Kyle Murbach
Abstract : This talk is meant to inform the next generation in aerospace cybersecurity by discussing our major research milestones, relevant findings, lessons learned, and areas of concern relating to the overall cybersecurity posture of small satellite systems.
Breaking the Beam:Exploiting VSAT Modems from Earth – Lenders, Willbold, Bisping
Abstract : Our presentation at DEF CON is part of a project that has three parts.
In the first part, we focus on the inherent security issues in current VSAT system practices. This work will be appear in May at ACM WiSec 2024.
The second part deals with the systematic evaluation of wireless signal injection attacks using a software-defined radio. This work will appear in August at Usenix Security 2024.
The third part of the project deals with reverse-engineering of the software and network stack of satellite modems and the development of exploits that can be injected over the air through the antenna dish of a VSAT terminal from the ground. This part shall be presented at DEF CON this year.
Analyzing the Security of Satellite Based Air Traffic Control -Martin Strohmeier
Abstract : Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Contract (ADS-C) is a satellite-based aviation datalink application used to monitor aircraft in remote regions. It is a crucial method for air traffic control to track aircraft where other protocols such as ADS-B lack connectivity. Even though it has been conceived more than 30 years ago, and other legacy communication protocols in aviation have shown to be vulnerable, ADS-C’s security has not been investigated so far in the literature. We conduct a first investigation to close this gap.
Bridging Space and Medicine – Fernando De La Peña Llaca
Abstract : In the vast expanse of space, holographic teleportation—a futuristic blend of holography and teleportation—has revolutionized astronaut communication. Imagine beaming a lifelike 3D image of yourself across light-years. Now, consider its potential in medicine: remote surgeries, expert consultations, and training—where distance dissolves, and expertise transcends borders. Buckle up; holoconnect is our cosmic ticket to healing!
Ground Control to Major Threat Hacking the Space Link Extension Protocol – Andrzej Olch
Abstract : Space missions have increasingly been the subject in the context of security breaches and satellite hacks. The majority of discussions revolve around direct communication and access to spacecraft through means such as Software Defined Radio. However, the reality is that this approach isn’t practical for most adversaries, as it requires substantial resources and is easily detectable due to the power and radio frequencies required to command a spacecraft. Instead, adversaries might shift their focus away from the Space Segment and opt for a more practical approach, such as accessing and exploiting the Ground Segment vulnerabilities and flaws in order to gain control over spacecraft.
From Theory to Reality Demonstrating the Simplicity of SPARTA Techniques – Randi Tinney
Abstract : Demonstrating the transition from theorized space cyber attacks to practical proof of concepts. The presentation will utilize a simple yet effective attack, a man-in-the-middle attack, on the ground infrastructure to demonstrate how many SPARTA techniques and sub-techniques can be performed against a spacecraft from the ground infrastructure. By illustrating the significant impact of this simplified concept, we aim to emphasize the urgent need for enhanced cybersecurity measures throughout the entire lifecycle of space missions and break the inherit trust between the ground and spacecraft.
GPS spoofing it’s about time, not just position – Ken Munro
Abstract : Talking to pilots and operators, an important aspect of GPS spoofing and jamming is being missed from the narrative in the media. We know about position spoofing, that’s a given. What doesn’t appear to be getting much attention is the effect of time spoofing.
Below are not space but aviation security talks
How I Developed a Low Cost Raspberry Pi Based Device for ADS B Spoof – Angelina Tsuboi
The device receives ADS-B information from the antenna and the software-defined radio, which is then passed into a Convolutional Neural Network written with Python to detect whether or not the aircraft is spoofed. I trained the neural network on a dataset of valid ADS-B signals as well as a generated spoofed set of aircraft signals, to teach Fly Catcher how to detect and flag any suspicious ADS-B signals. It does this by checking for discrepancies in the signal’s characteristics, such as its location, velocity, and identification.
The Interplay between Safety and Security in Aviation Systems – Lillian Ash Baker
Abstract : Safety has been at the forefront of Civil Aviation since the formalization of DO-178, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, in 1981. However, times have changed since then and we live in a world with seemingly limitless connectivity. DO-356A, Airworthiness Security Methods and Considerations, forms the cybersecurity bedrock in which aviation systems are designed and implemented. In this talk, participants will learn about how Safety and Security is applied to system design and how they interact with one another. Design Assurance Levels (DAL) and Security Assurance Levels (SAL) concepts are presented and explained what their purpose is. This talk is designed to appeal to the general cybersecurity community by introducing fundamentals of Safety analyses and discussing how Safety and Security interact with one another.
RF Attacks on Aviation’s Defense Against Mid-Air Collisions – G. Longo, V. Lenders
Abstract : Aviation’s Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II has been touted as a foolproof safety net since its introduction in the 1980s. But what if we told you that this supposedly impenetrable system can be compromised? For years, attacks on TCAS have been mere theoretical exercises, foiled by an (accidental) built in security feature. That is, until now. In this presentation, we’ll reveal the first working RF attacks on TCAS II, demonstrating how to hijack collision avoidance displays and create fake Traffic Advisories (TAs) and Resolution Advisories (RAs). We’ll walk you through the technical challenges of building the necessary tooling using commercial off-the-shelf hardware.
Navigating the Turbulent Skies of Aviation Cyber Regulation – M. Weigand, S. Wagner
Abstract : This combination presentation and panel discussion will surface the policy and technical challenges associated with securing civil aviation, bringing together perspectives from government, industry, and aviation cybersecurity companies. Given the continued growth in civil aviation and impending regulation in the United States of America and Europe, this talk will describe the key technical challenges and the resulting policy challenges that should be addressed to keep civil aviation secure.
I’m very proud to receive the following certificate of completion for having successfully completed the training course : « Introduction to Cybersecurity in Space Systems » with Tim Fowler.
This training course took place at « The Most Offensive Con that Ever Offensived – Bypass Edition » event organized by Antisyphon Training from 13 to 15 March, 2024.
« Introduction to Cybersecurity in Space Systems » was a course designed to expose cybersecurity professionals to the concepts and implementations of space systems including the ramification and impacts security can have on a mission.
In this course each element was broken down into its most basic components and we had the opportunity to look at how proper security can be applied; what tradeoffs must be made and many of the operational constraints governing every design decision.
This course walked students through each of the segments that make up a space system, the subsystems that comprise a spacecraft, and ways that each need to be defended from attacks.
This course also included multiple hands-on labs that will walk students through the process of implementing a custom ground station solution, a virtual satellite with simulated subsystems, and executing simulated attacks against both.
At the completion of this course, I have now a fundamental knowledge and understanding of space systems, how and where security can be implemented and I have a set of tools, I can use to further their knowledge and experience.
First of all, I want to congratulate Antisyphon Training and Tim Fowler for the high-quality of this training.
My first impressions is that the slides have a high-quality. I noticed that Tim’s terminology is very precise. This shows Tim’s great experience and expertise. The labs was very practical and simulate reality. The lab environment was very comprehensive and highly technical.
In conclusion, I’m really happy and proud to have had this unique opportunity to follow Tim’s training.
It gave me access to unique content of great value. Tim had the opportunity to demonstrate his great expertise and experience on the subject.
I definitely recommend to follow this course to someone who want to increase its knowledge in space systems cybersecurity.
In this article, I will show how I used the MITRE EMB3D™ Threat Model to identify vulnerabilities in SIEMENS PLCs that were exploited by the Stuxnet worm to sabotage the Iran’s nuclear centrifuges.
About the MITRE EMB3D™ Threat Model
EMB3D™ is a Cybersecurity Threat Model release by MITRE in May 2024 and dedicated for Embedded Devices.
EMB3D is aligned with and expands on several existing models, including Common Weakness Enumeration, MITRE ATT&CK®, and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, but with a specific embedded-device focus. The threats defined within EMB3D are based on observation of use by threat actors, proof-of-concept and theoretical/conceptual security research publications, and device vulnerability and weakness reports. These threats are mapped to device properties to help users develop and tailor accurate threat models for specific embedded devices.
Coming in the next release of EMB3D in Summer 2024, each threat description will include a set of Foundational, Intermediate, and Leading mitigations. These mitigations will provide guidance on what technical mechanisms can best prevent or reduce the risk of that threat.
For each threat, EMB3D will suggest technical mechanisms that vendors should build into the device to mitigate the given threat. EMB3D is a comprehensive framework for the entire security ecosystem—device vendors, asset owners, security researchers, and testing organizations.
To know more about the MITRE EMB3D™ Cybersecurity Threat Model for Embedded Devices, check our article here.
About the Stuxnet attack
Stuxnet is a highly sophisticated worm discovered in 2010, believed to be developed jointly by the United States and Israel. It targeted supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, particularly those used in Iran’s nuclear program. Stuxnet specifically aimed at disrupting uranium enrichment processes by sabotaging centrifuges, demonstrating the potential of cyber weapons to physically damage critical infrastructure. Its complex code and ability to spread rapidly made it one of the most advanced and impactful cyber weapons ever deployed.
Stuxnet attack overview
Stuxnet specifically targeted industrial process control systems manufactured by Siemens, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs). It exploited vulnerabilities in the software and communication protocols used by these systems to infiltrate and take control of the PLCs. Once infected, the PLCs could be manipulated to disrupt the operation of the centrifuges used in the Iranian nuclear program.
What is STEP 7 in Siemens PLC and how does Siemens PLC work
STEP 7 is a software platform developed by Siemens for programming and configuring its programmable logic controllers (PLCs). It is part of the Totally Integrated Automation (TIA) Portal, which provides a comprehensive suite of tools for automation tasks, including PLC programming, human-machine interface (HMI) design, and more.
Siemens PLCs are industrial control devices used to automate processes in various industries, such as manufacturing, energy, and transportation. They consist of hardware components, such as the CPU (central processing unit), input/output modules, and communication modules, which interface with sensors, actuators, and other devices in the physical environment.
The PLC’s operation is based on a programmed logic controller, which executes a control program created using software like STEP 7. The program defines the behavior of the PLC in response to inputs from sensors and other sources. When inputs change, the PLC processes this information according to the program’s logic and produces outputs to control actuators, machinery, or other devices.
More about the Siemens STEP 7 software platform here.
Identifying properties of the Siemens embedded device
What I consider as an embedded device is the STEP7 Workstation and the Siemens S7 series PLCs.
Device Property #1
Siemens S7-300 PLC does not include a traditional operating system (OS) or kernel in the same sense as a general-purpose computer. Instead, it operates using firmware that is specifically designed for real-time control tasks. This firmware is tightly integrated with the hardware of the PLC and is optimized for deterministic and reliable operation in industrial environments.
Applications and softwares are present and running on Siemens PLCs. These softwares are used for programming and configuring the PLC to perform specific control tasks. In the case of Siemens PLCs, the programming software is typically part of the Totally Integrated Automation (TIA) Portal suite, which includes tools like STEP 7 for programming.
Programmers use this application-level software to create control logic using programming languages such as ladder logic, function block diagram (FBD), or structured text. Once the control program is developed, it is downloaded to the PLC, where it runs directly on the PLC’s firmware.
This application-level software allows users to define the behavior of the PLC, specify how inputs should be processed, define control logic, and configure outputs to interact with the physical environment. It also provides tools for debugging, monitoring, and maintaining the PLC program during operation.
Siemens PLCs, including the S7-300 series, have the ability to deploy custom programs created using engineering software or integrated development environments (IDEs). Siemens provides programming software such as STEP 7 (part of the TIA Portal suite) for developing custom control logic programs.
Siemens PLCs do include system function blocks, which are pre-defined blocks of logic that perform specific tasks within the PLC’s firmware. These function blocks are provided by Siemens as part of the PLC’s programming environment and are used for various system-level tasks, such as reading system information, manipulating data blocks, managing communication protocols, and performing other administrative functions.
The following table is mapping the Device Properties to a list of Threats the Siemens S7 series PLCs may be exposed to because it incorporates those properties and features.
Modeling an attack on an Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
To model an attack on an Industrial Control Systems (ICS), it’s recommanded to use an offensive model.
There are two offensive models dedicated to Industrial Control Systems (ICS):
The MITRE ATT&CK for ICS matrix
The ICS Cyber Kill Chain
To know more how to model an attack on an Industrial Control Systems (ICS) but also about the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS matrix and the ICS Cyber Kill Chain, go to out entire and complete article on this subject here.
Mapping of Stuxnet attack on the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS matrix
Below is the mapping of Stuxnet attack on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Than’ks to Airbus Cybersecurity). « Mapping Stuxnet to the ATT&CK for ICS matrix, as shown in figure 3, quickly shows how complex this attack was. Business risk owners can now identify which techniques to focus on if they need to minimise the risk from strikes like Stuxnet. »
Mapping of Stuxnet on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Source: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/mitre-attck-for-ics-everything-you-need-to-know/)
ICS Cyber Kill Chain applied to STUXNET
The figure below is the ICS Cyber Kill Chain applied to STUXNET.
Collaborative framework provides common understanding to mitigate cyber threats to critical infrastructure
MCLEAN, Va. & BEDFORD, Mass., May 13, 2024–(BUSINESS WIRE)–The EMB3D Threat Model is now publicly available at https://emb3d.mitre.org. The model provides a cultivated knowledge base of cyber threats to embedded devices, providing a common understanding of these threats with the security mechanisms required to mitigate them. The model is the result of a collaborative effort by MITRE, Niyo Little Thunder Pearson, Red Balloon Security, and Narf Industries.
“The diverse perspectives and invaluable insights shared have fortified our approach, ensuring a robust and effective solution to address the evolving challenges in embedded device security.”
EMB3D model strengthened by peer reviews from infrastructure industries
After the model garnered significant interest for peer review across diverse industries, numerous organizations piloted the threat model, offering invaluable feedback. The EMB3D team appreciates the interest and feedback from vendors and integrators across many industries, including energy, water, manufacturing, aerospace, health, and automotive, as well as researchers and threat tool vendors. This ongoing collaborative effort has been instrumental in refining and enhancing the model’s content and usability. The team looks forward to continued collaboration to strengthen the ability of the model to enable « secure by design. »
« Our framework’s strength lies in the collaborative efforts and rigorous review process across industries, » said Yosry Barsoum, vice president and director, Center for Securing the Homeland at MITRE. « The diverse perspectives and invaluable insights shared have fortified our approach, ensuring a robust and effective solution to address the evolving challenges in embedded device security. »
Leveraging established models to strengthen embedded device security
EMB3D aligns with and expands on several existing models, including Common Weakness Enumeration, MITRE ATT&CK®, and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, but with a specific embedded-device focus. The threats defined within EMB3D are based on observation of use by threat actors, proof-of-concept and theoretical/conceptual security research publications, and device vulnerability and weakness reports. These threats are mapped to device properties to help users develop and tailor accurate threat models for specific embedded devices.
For each threat, EMB3D suggests technical mechanisms that vendors should build into the device to mitigate the given threat. EMB3D is a comprehensive framework for the entire security ecosystem—device vendors, asset owners, security researchers, and testing organizations.
Associated mitigations
Each threat includes mitigation guidance, these often have varying efficacies and challenges with their implementations.
Mitigation tiers are intended to help device vendors/OEMs better understand how to assess the challenge of deploying mitigations and better strategize and prioritize efforts to add additional mitigations or technologies to address threats.
ISA/IEC 62443-4-2 Mappings
ISA is the International Society of Automation. ISA/IEC 62443 is the applicable standard for cybersecurity of OT and ICS (IACS).
Each associated mitigation is mapped with the ISA/IEC 62443-4-2.
An evolving framework for a dynamic threat landscape
EMB3D is intended to be a living framework, where new threats and mitigations are added and updated as new threat actors emerge and security researchers discover new categories of vulnerabilities, threats, and security defenses. EMB3D is a public, community resource where all information is openly available and the security community can submit additions and revisions.
MITRE’s mission-driven teams are dedicated to solving problems for a safer world. Through our public-private partnerships and federally funded R&D centers, we work across government and in partnership with industry to tackle challenges to the safety, stability, and well-being of our nation. Learn more at mitre.org.
In March of 2022, Network battalion 65 (NB65), a hacktivist affiliate of Anonymous, publicly asserted its successful breach of ROSCOSMOS’s satellite imaging capabilities in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
NB65 disseminated a series of primary sources as substantiation, proclaiming the incapacitation of ROSCOSMOS’s space-based vehicle monitoring system and doxing of related proprietary documentation.
Despite the profound implications of hacktivist incursions into the space sector, the event has garnered limited attention due to the obscurity of technical attack vectors and ROCOSMOS’s denial of NB65’s allegations.
Through analysis of NB65’s released primary sources of evidence, this paper uncovers the probable vulnerabilities and exploits that enabled the alleged breach into ROSCOSMOS’s ground and space segment. Additionally, this paper highlights lessons learned and the consequences this event has for the global aerospace community.
The authors of this paper are : Rajiv Thummala and Gregory Falco
I february 2024, I successfully passed the Certificate of Competence in Zero Trust (CCZT) from the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA).
This certificate is a logical follow-up to the CCSK (Certificate of Cloud Security Knowledge) awarded by the same CSA organization (to know more about CCSK, read my article here).
Zero Trust Philosophy is :
Never Trust Always verify
Assume a hostile environment
Assume breach
Scrutinize explicitly
Apply unified analytics
The CCZT is considered the first Zero Trust certificate in the industry, developed by combining the guidance of Zero Trust experts, foundational documents from authoritative sources, and leadership from vendor-neutral CSA Research.
Building on the foundational principle of Zero Trust that no part of a computing and networking system can be implicitly trusted, CCZT will give you the knowledge and skills necessary to implement a Zero Trust strategy and reduce systemic risk.
CCZT outlines how to put specific measures in place to provide assurance that systems and their components operate appropriately and are continuously verified.
CCZT enables you to understand and implement Zero Trust principles into business planning, enterprise architectures, and technology deployments.
The Certificate of Competence in Zero Trust consists of the following topics:
Cet article est issu d’un post de Stéphane MORICO (Information Security Analyst | CEO @SMRC) sur LinkedIn.
Le hors série « Space Cybersecurity » édité par PenTest et Hakin9 se consacre à l’examen approfondi de la cybersécurité dans le secteur spatial, abordant une multitude de perspectives critiques et d’innovations dans ce domaine en pleine expansion.
Il ouvre sur l’avenir de la communication par satellites, en mettant l’accent sur les communications optiques et laser, présentées par Angelina Tsuboi, qui souligne à la fois leurs avantages et leurs vulnérabilités, telles que la précision extrême requise pour le pointage des faisceaux et la susceptibilité aux interférences et aux attaques physiques.
Sylvester Kaczmarek discute des mesures de cybersécurité dans l’exploration spatiale moderne, soulignant la vulnérabilité des systèmes spatiaux autonomes aux attaques logicielles qui pourraient compromettre leurs missions en altérant subtilement leur comportement ou en transmettant des données fausses.
Jamel Metmati présente le S-WAN, un outil de simulation pour tester les systèmes spatiaux, qui aide à comprendre et corriger les anomalies dans les satellites avant et pendant leur phase opérationnelle, en complément des tests réels.
William Ferguson aborde le développement de la main-d’œuvre en cybersécurité spatiale dans « Space Threats and Operational Risks to Mission (STORM) », soulignant l’importance de la coopération internationale et des initiatives de formation comme Moonlighter, Hack-a-Sat, et Aerospace Village.
Dr Jordan Plotnek introduit le cadre COSMOS2 pour la gestion de la sécurité des systèmes spatiaux, résultat d’un projet de recherche pluriannuel visant à protéger les systèmes spatiaux contre diverses menaces à travers une taxonomie détaillée.
Olga Nasibullina met en lumière l’importance cruciale de la cybersécurité dans les opérations spatiales, avec une emphase sur l’éducation et la formation à travers des initiatives comme les Space Operations Cyber Ranges, développées par l’Agence Spatiale Européenne et d’autres acteurs.
Anais Shay-Lynn Videlingum discute de la cybersécurité spatiale comme enjeu géopolitique stratégique, mettant en avant la dépendance croissante des sociétés aux infrastructures spatiales et la nécessité de protéger les satellites en orbite pour garantir la continuité des services et une certaine résilience.
Mikols Tomka et Isabela Leandersson soulignent l’importance du concept de « Secure-by-Design » pour les satellites, en réponse aux conseils des agences de cybersécurité, et alertent sur la vulnérabilité des satellites et l’infrastructure critique qu’ils fournissent, souvent insuffisamment protégée.
Space Cybersecurity se positionne comme un compendium essentiel de connaissances, grâce à la contribution d’experts et de praticiens dans le domaine de la cybersécurité spatiale, offrant des insights précieux sur les défis et les stratégies de protection de l’infrastructure spatiale essentielle à de nombreux systèmes fondamentaux à l’échelle globale.
Pour en savoir plus : https://pentestmag.com/product/space-cybersecurity/
Extrait PDF du magazine : https://pentestmag.com/download/preview-space-cybersecurity/?ind=1708711895024&filename=SPACE-CYBERSECURITY-1708708347-2.pdf
Tim Fowler will provide a training course called « Introduction to Cybersecurity in Space Systems » at « The Most Offensive Con that Ever Offensived – Bypass Edition » event.
This event is organized by Antisyphon Training. This event will take place from 13 to 15 March, 2024.
Summit: March 13, 2024
Summit Training: March 14-15, 2024
About the course « Introduction to Cybersecurity in Space Systems »
Introduction to Cybersecurity in Space Systems is a course designed to expose cybersecurity professionals to the concepts and implementations of space systems including the ramification and impacts security can have on a mission.
In this course each element is broken down into its most basic components and we look at how proper security can be applied; what tradeoffs must be made and many of the operational constraints governing every design decision.
This course walks students through each of the segments that make up a space system, the subsystems that comprise a spacecraft, and ways that each need to be defended from attacks.
This course also includes multiple hands-on labs that will walk students through the process of implementing a custom ground station solution, a virtual satellite with simulated subsystems, and executing simulated attacks against both.
At the completion of this course, students will have a fundamental knowledge and understanding of space systems, how and where security can be implemented and have a set of tools, they can use to further their knowledge and experience.
If you wan to know what you will learn in thi scourse, check the Antisyphon Training website here.
Tim has obtained and maintains multiple industry certifications (OSCE, OSCP, OSWE, CRTO, CRTL, CISSP) and has leveraged his skills and knowledge both in consulting as well as working internally in multiple security roles within Fortune 100 financial institutions.
He frequently contributes to the infosec community by speaking con conferences, writing blogs, and participating in webcasts. He continues to hone his skills and abilities by having a research minded focus and not being afraid to fail in the process of learning.
Tim previously did a presentation at BSIDES St. Louis 2023 hacking education conference.
About the summit, The Most Offensive Con that Ever Offensived – Bypass Edition!
Is it the best defense is a good offense or the best offense is a good defense? For all the defenders out there, wouldn’t it be nice to understand the mind of an offensive security professional? And for all the offensive security professionals, wouldn’t it be amazing to learn from others who think about all the best ways to bypass defenses.
Join the Antisyphon Training team for hours of stimulating offensive talks, panels, and hopefully rants about what we can do to keep this arms race from growing cold.
This is a free event, where you can connect with your fellow attendees through Discord and Zoom chat! Keep the comments and memes flowing as our speakers share their knowledge with the community.
Learn to throw and take a punch at The Most Offensive Summit that Ever Offensived… again.
Find below my certificate of completion
To know more
Link to my article about the previous presentation of Tim at BSIDES St. Louis 2023 hacking education conference.
Angelina Tsuboi is a programmer, mechatronics developer and Engineer, a pilot, a Scientific Researcher and cybersecurity researcher. She is currently working for NASA. She is interested in educating others about the exciting field of aerospace cybersecurity in conjunction with developing her own programs and research in the field.
She is dedicated to advancing technology by developing inventions and conducting eclectic scientific research.
She is focused on applying computational and artificial intelligence to research fields such as electromagnetism, astrophysics, quantum mechanics, and biology.
To celebrate the holiday season, Angelina created comprehensive guides centered around aerospace cybersecurity, exploring concepts across satellites, drones, aircraft, and beyond — all at a special holiday discount.
This is a four extensive step-by-step manuals covering aerospace cybersecurity.
This bundle includes : Aerospace Cybersecurity: Satellite, Aerospace Cybersecurity: Drones, Aerospace Cybersecurity: Airplanes, Aerospace Cybersecurity: Signals Intelligence
Learn about aerospace cybersecurity, with this interactive step-by-step aerospace cybersecurity bundle. This bundle contains four manuals covering different subfields in aerospace security: satellites, drones, airplanes, and signals intelligence systems.
Topics Covered :
Satellites: Learn about satellite communications systems and common vulnerabilities found within satellite firmware and programs.
Drones: Uncover the vulnerabilities and intricacies of drone communication systems. Explore how malicious actors might exploit UAV and learn about defensive strategies.
Airplanes: Navigate the cybersecurity challenges in aircraft systems. Gain insights into the unique complexities of aviation networks, from in-flight data transmission to ground-based communications.
Signals Intelligence: Dive into modern electronic warfare with a focus on signals intelligence. Understand how SIGINT plays a role in deciphering, intercepting, and analyzing communications, offering a crucial advantage in safeguarding aerospace systems.
Learn more about aerospace cybersecurity, with this interactive step-by-step satellite security manual. This guide walks you through satellite communication basics to advanced satellite signal analysis and protocol exploitation via programs and immersive labs.
Topics Covered :
Satellite Communication Basics: Build a strong foundation in satellite communication, exploring frequency bands, modulation techniques, and transmission protocols.
Satellite Tracking and Identification: Master advanced methods like orbital parameter analysis, radio frequency monitoring, and optical tracking. Understand the critical role of accurate tracking for defense and attack scenarios.
Satellite Vulnerabilities and Threats: Delve into the vulnerabilities satellites face, from weak encryption to physical attacks. Learn to defend against potential threats effectively.
Satellite Signal Analysis: Acquire skills in decoding and interpreting satellite signals, including telemetry, tracking, and control signals. Understand hacker techniques and how to thwart them.
Satellite Protocol Exploitation: Uncover security weaknesses in communication protocols like TCP/IP, DVB-S, and CCSDS. Gain practical experience in exploiting and mitigating these vulnerabilities.
Learn more about aerospace cybersecurity, with this interactive step-by-step drone security manual. This guide walks you through UAV communication basics to advanced digital forensics and RF communication exploitation via programs and immersive labs.
Topics Covered :
Drone Systems and Threat Modeling: Decode the fundamental components, architecture, and threat modeling techniques, providing insights into potential vulnerabilities.
Drone Identification and Tracking: Master the art of recognizing drone identifiers and implementing tracking methods, including RF triangulation, GPS tracking, and radar systems.
Ground Control System: Uncover the pivotal role of ground control systems, identifying vulnerabilities and fortifying security measures.
Drone Digital Forensics: Navigate the realm of digital forensics tailored to drone incidents. Acquire skills to investigate, analyze digital evidence, and reconstruct events.
Radio Communications and Protocols: Gain proficiency in wireless communication protocols such as Wi-Fi, radio control, and cellular networks. Learn to intercept and analyze drone communications.
Countermeasures and Defense: Arm yourself with knowledge to safeguard drones against potential threats. Explore encryption, authentication, RF signal jamming, and other defense techniques.
Learn more about aerospace cybersecurity, with this interactive step-by-step signals intelligence for aerospace security manual. This guide walks you through aerospace signals communication basics to advanced modulation techniques via programs and immersive labs.
Topics Covered :
Conceptual Understanding of Satellite, Drone, and Aircraft Communication Systems: Gain a deep insight into the communication frameworks of satellites, drones, and aircraft, laying a robust conceptual foundation for further exploration.
Decoding Aerospace Transmissions: Acquire practical skills in decoding complex transmissions, unraveling the intricacies of communication protocols employed in aerospace systems.
Relevant RF Analysis Tools for Enhanced Cybersecurity: Familiarize yourself with essential tools such as GNU Radio, SatDump, and Fissure, honing your ability to perform precise and effective RF analysis.
Packet Decoding and Reverse Engineering: Master the art of packet decoding and reverse engineering, crucial skills for understanding and manipulating data within aerospace communications.
Emerging Prevalence of SIGINT in Modern Electronic Warfare: Explore the evolving landscape of signals intelligence in the context of modern electronic warfare, understanding its growing significance.
Defensive Strategies to Safeguard Aerospace Systems: Equip yourself with defensive strategies to fortify aerospace systems against common RF attacks, ensuring the resilience of critical communication infrastructure.
Learn more about aerospace cybersecurity, with this interactive step-by-step airplane security manual. This guide walks you through airplane telemetry and subsystem basics to radar interpretation and in-flight entertainment system firmware analysis via programs and immersive labs.
Topics Covered :
Aircraft Attack Surfaces and Threat Modeling : Uncover vulnerabilities in aviation systems and build threat models to proactively identify potential risks.
Internet of Wings (IoW): Navigate the connectivity landscape of aviation and learn to secure the Internet of Things (IoT) soaring through the skies.
Threat Modeling and Mitigation : Delve into aviation-specific threat modeling techniques and mitigation strategies to fortify aerospace systems.
Secure Communication with Ground Control : Master the art of ensuring secure and reliable communication between aircraft and ground control.
Securing Passenger Wi-Fi and Inflight Entertainment Systems : Explore the challenges of securing passenger amenities while ensuring a safe and enjoyable flying experience.
ADS-B and Radar Systems : Gain insight into vulnerabilities associated with Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) and radar systems.
Regulatory Framework and Compliance : Navigate the complex landscape of aviation regulations, including FAA and ICAO standards, to ensure compliance.
Data Encryption and Protection : Master the intricacies of encrypting and protecting sensitive aviation data against cyber threats.
Incident Response and Recovery Planning : Develop comprehensive incident response and recovery plans tailored to aviation cybersecurity incidents.
We are pleased to announce that the 2nd International Conference on Gravitation, Astrophysics and Cosmology (ICGAC2026) will be held on April 16-18, 2026, in...
In the following article, discover the major advancements announced with the release of SPARTA v3.1: the addition of new NIST space segment guidance, the...
Disclaimer
Please be informed that the analysis detailed in this article is entirely separate from the hacking experiment conducted by the Thales team on the...
Disclaimer
Please be informed that the analysis detailed in this article is entirely separate from the hacking experiment conducted by the Thales team on the...
Avec l'aimable autorisation de Martial Le Guédard, nous reproduisons ci-dessous sa cartographie au sujet des différents acteurs étatiques évoluant dans le domaine du Cyber...
L'illustration ci-dessous est une carte heuristique qui présente les services spécialisés de la communauté du renseignement du 1er cercle. Cette cartographie est mise à...
A la différence des attaques électroniques qui interférent avec la transmission des signaux de Radio Fréquence, les cyberattaques visent quant à elles, les données...
Avec l'aimable autorisation de Martial Le Guédard, nous reproduisons ci-dessous sa cartographie au sujet des différents acteurs étatiques évoluant dans le domaine du Cyber...
L'illustration ci-dessous est une carte heuristique qui présente les services spécialisés de la communauté du renseignement du 1er cercle. Cette cartographie est mise à...
A la différence des attaques électroniques qui interférent avec la transmission des signaux de Radio Fréquence, les cyberattaques visent quant à elles, les données...
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