Solarium CSC 2.0 has endorsed designation of space systems as a critical infrastructure sector

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4 May 2023

The Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) was established in the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 to “develop a consensus on a strategic approach to defending the United States in cyberspace against cyber attacks of significant consequences.” The finished report was presented to the public on March 11, 2020. The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 reauthorized the Commission to collect and assess feedback on the analysis and recommendations contained within the final report, review the implementation of the recommendations contained within the final report, and completing the activities originally set forth for the Commission.

Today, the Cybersecurity Solarium Commission (Solarium CSC 2.0) has endorsed designation of space systems as a critical infrastructure sector.

Time to Designate Space Systems as Critical Infrastructure

America’s adversaries recognize the importance of space systems to U.S. national security and economic prosperity and have tested capabilities to destroy them.

Find below the Executive Summary of the report

You can access to the Executive Summary of the report here.

“We’re in a space race” with China, NASA Administrator Bill Nelson warned in December. The nature of that race is different from the Cold War contest with the Soviet Union that America fought and won. The national security components of the space race today include not just weapons systems but also the security of critical infrastructure — much of which relies on global positioning satellites, remote imagery, and advanced communication. The economic aspect is just as striking. The Space Foundation, a nonprofit advocacy group, has determined that the global space industry generated $469 billion in revenue in 2021. This number will only increase with technological and manufacturing innovation.

More than a decade ago, the U.S. National Security Space Strategy warned that space will become more “congested, contested, and competitive.” This warning proved prescient, but the U.S. government has not done enough to adapt to that reality. Major portions of American space systems are still not designated as critical infrastructure and do not receive the attention or resources such a designation would entail. The majority of today’s space systems were developed under the premise that space was a sanctuary from conflict, but this is no longer the case. The threat from Russia and China is growing. Both those authoritarian powers have placed American and partner space systems in their crosshairs, as demonstrated by their testing of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. The United States needs a more concerted and coherent approach to risk management and public-private collaboration regarding space systems infrastructure.

After interviewing more than 30 industry and government experts, the authors have concluded that designating space systems as a U.S. critical infrastructure sector would close current gaps and signal both at home and abroad that space security and resilience is a top priority. In 2013, Presidential Policy Directive-21 (PPD-21) designated 16 critical infrastructure sectors “so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” Space systems clearly meet this threshold.

The term “space systems” encompasses the ecosystem from ground to orbit, including sensors and signals, data and payloads, and critical technologies and supply chains. (See Figure 1.) This terminology (which sidesteps the conceptual debates about whether “space” is an infrastructure or only a domain) aligns with presidential Space Policy Directive-5 (SPD-5) of September 2020, which defines space systems to include ground systems, sensor networks, and space vehicles. SPD-5 provided a set of voluntary best practices “to guide and serve as the foundation for the United States Government approach to the cyber protection of space systems.” This report seeks to build on these efforts, which constituted an important step toward recognizing and addressing the implications of the nexus between the cyber and space domains.

Protecting space systems will require an enhanced model of public-private partnership with genuinely shared risk management responsibilities. On the government side, the agency that serves as lead sector risk management agency (SRMA) for this sector will have a demanding task — but one that NASA is well suited to fulfill so long as it receives the extra resources necessary to develop its capacity to protect national security, civil, and commercial systems. There will need to be subgroups within the sector that maintain relationships with other government agencies. One subgroup should deal with defense and intelligence systems, and another with communications systems already regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). But no alternative candidate for lead SRMA possesses the same range of requisite capabilities as NASA.

Fostering security and resilience in the space systems sector will require mitigating unique cybersecurity challenges that stem from the geographic and technological particularities of space, as well as new and emerging space-based missions. Substantial investment through congressional appropriation will be imperative because policy without resources is merely rhetoric.

This report does some recommendations for Congress

Recommendation 1: Designate space systems as a critical infrastructure sector.

1.1 – Designate NASA as the SRMA for the space systems sector.
1.2 – Create two directed subgroups within the sector.
1.3 – Do not assign the SRMA as a regulatory role.
1.4 – Articulate and offer industry a clear value proposition.
1.5 – Strengthen international norms and standards.
1.6 – Integrate the National Space Council into the governance of the space systems sector.

Recommendation 2: Give NASA, the lead SRMA, the resources to effectively accomplish the mission.

2.1 – Direct the Congressional Research Service to undertake a legislative review.

Recommendation 3: Marshal and organize the commercial space community to play an instrumental role in governance.

3.1 – Establish a space systems sector coordinating council (SCC).
3.2 – Task the SCC, through its charter, with working to reduce risks to the security and resilience of the commercial space sector.
3.3 – Leverage and build upon the existing work of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), including the Space ISAC.

Recommendation 4: Create a co-led risk management enterprise.

4.1 – Jointly elaborate and widely implement cybersecurity best practices.
4.2 – Pair commercial and government capabilities to model a dynamic risk environment.
4.3 – Add space assets positioned outside of traditional operational areas to enhance U.S. resilience.

The space systems threat spectrum

Here is a quite nice graphic showing at a high level space systems and the threats we have to address.

The examples cited below are illustrative and not exhaustive.

In-Orbit segment

Beams (Tracking/Other Uses), Satellites. Spacecraft. Space Debris,
and Space Mining and Manufacturing

THREATS : Anti-satellite, Command Intrusion, Denial Of Service (DoS), Malware, Payload Control, Space Debris

Links segment

Crosslinks, Downlinks and Uplinks

THREATS : Command Intrusion, Spoofing, Jamming, Espionnage

Launch segment

Vehicules/Technlology in Transit to LEO & Beyond

THREATS : Collision, Command Intrusion, Denial Of Service (DoS), Malware

Ground Segment

Adaptive Optics, Command and Control Centers, Ground Stations, Manufacturing, Networks, Receivers, and R&D Centers

THREATS : Hiiacking, Insider Threat, Malware

Find below the full report

You can access the full report here

More about CSC 2.0

You can know more about CSC 2.0 here.

Key Takeaways from CYSAT 2023 by Mathieu Bailly, VP at CYSEC and Director of CYSAT

By

François Quiquet

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2 May 2023

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CYSAT 2023 is over. It’s time to review everything that has happened during this amazing event. But first, let’s remember what CYSAT is.

CYSAT is the leading European cybersecurity and space exhibition that took place 26th-27th April in Paris (Station F). This is the biggest European event entirely focused on cybersecurity for the space industry.

Since 2021, the event brings space and cybersecurity experts together to create a European ecosystem capable of responding to the current and future challenges faced by the European space industry.

Faced with cybersecurity challenges and the growing importance of data protection in space, it is crucial to bring together communities of cybersecurity experts to build a European ecosystem capable of addressing current and future industry challenges.

Last years’ event saw more than 450 space specialists, decision-makers and experts come together. In its third year, CYSAT highlighted Europe’s cybersecurity capabilities and solutions dedicated to space from both a technological and geostrategic perspective.

To find the full programme and more information on the event, visit: https://cysat.eu/

Mathieu Bailly, VP at CYSEC, Co-founder and Director of CYSAT, has published on his linkedin profile the key takeaways he retained during these 2 days. We publish these key takeaways below with his permission. Thank’s to Mathieu for sharing whith us its key takeaways.

Mathieu Bailly, VP Space chez CYSEC et Directeur de CYSAT

My 9️⃣ take-aways from CYSAT season 3 👇 from a happy event director!

1️⃣ A success💥
🔹Our mission 🎯 to raise awareness about #cybersecurity in the #space industry is progressing
🔹This can only be achieved by connecting people. We double the number of participants every year 📈, we manage to get all players involved ✅
🔹Many positive feedback of people happy to meet and network. Just for that CYSAT season 3 was a success!

2️⃣ Tech sessions were a big hit!
🔹NEW this year, many people mentioned the quality of the presentations
🔹Thanks to the startups and researchers on stage (with the normal rate of live demo failures 🤓)
🔹Kudos to all presenters, especially my colleagues Yannick Roelvink and Louis Masson for presenting respectively the CYSEC products ARCA SATCOM and SATLINK 🚀

3️⃣ Ukraine and Viasat 🇺🇦
🔹The 2022 attack definitely shook off the industry
🔹Was important for me to have a first-hand testimonial of General Oleksandr Potii live from Kiev explaining the critical importance of 🛰️
🔹Not only for comms and intelligence on the battlefield but also to allow civilians to stay connected 🌍

4️⃣ Team Europe 🇪🇺
🔹Honored to have space execs coming now to CYSAT using the event to make major announcements
🔹The EU commission represented by Guillaume de La Brosse took the opportunity to promote the upcoming EU Space law and EU Space ISAC. These are two big news, can’t wait to hear more about it

5️⃣ #IRIS2: high expectations
🔹One of the hottest topic this year. Stakes are high and timing is tight!
🔹Was great to have a more extensive appreciation of the Comission’s perspective on the cyber aspects with Nicolas Guillermin
🔹Both EUSPA with Rodrigo da Costa and ESA with Massimo Mercati presented their approach and upcoming opportunities for the industry

6️⃣ Hacking demo 👾
🔹Thales is making the buzz after presenting their successful demo of hacking and recovering ESA’s OPS-SAT 👏
🔹This is something we’ve been trying to do since summer 2021 so very happy to finally see it on stage 👊
🔹Thales team did a great job at explaining the technical aspects of the demo ⚙️ and were very transparent about the support they received from the OPS-SAT team, 👌 David Evans

7️⃣ Greg Wyler: “Less is more”
🔹Very happy to host Greg, a legendary space entrepreneur now full steam with his latest venture E-Space.
🔹I liked his approach of making things as simple as possible to reduce the attack surface and make the CISO or the PSO’s jobs a realistic task.

8️⃣ Finding talents! 👨‍🎓 👩‍🎓
🔹I think every single speaker I was on stage with said they were looking for talents. This is a major challenge now
🔹We had about 50 students at CYSAT with free tickets, hope they were able to make the most of it!

9️⃣ CYSAT 2024
Not everything was perfect this year, the acoustic was terrible the first morning, coffee would be appreciated at the start of the day, food can be massively improved, etc we will learn and improve for next year!

All 2023 CYSAT videos are online

All videos about 2023 CYSAT in Paris, the biggest European event around cybersecurity for commercial space, are online and can be seen here.

A propos de CYSEC

CYSEC is a Franco-Swiss cybersecurity company that is a pioneer in the protection of satellites and data collected and transmitted in space.

The company has just launched two security products in 2023, ARCA SATCOM dedicated to the satellite internet market, and ARCA SATLINK dedicated to constellation operators.

For more information : www.cysec.com

Aerospace Corporation released SPARTA v1.3, a new version of the Space Attack Research and Tactic Analysis (SPARTA) matrix

By

François Quiquet

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30 April 2023

0

Thank’s to Calogero Vinciguerra (Space Policy Officer & Space Threats Response Architecture DO at the European External Action Service, EEAS) and Kimberly King (Senior Engineer at The Aerospace Corporation) for helping me to write this article.

Aerospace Corporation released SPARTA v1.3, a new version of the Space Attack Research and Tactic Analysis (SPARTA) matrix.

The Aerospace Corporation’s Space Attack Research and Tactic Analysis (SPARTA) matrix is intended to provide unclassified information to space professionals about how spacecraft may be compromised due to adversarial actions across the attack lifecycle.

SPARTA is an ATT&CK® like knowledge-base framework but for for Space Missions.

SPARTA framework offers space professionals a taxonomy of potential cyber threats to spacecraft and space missions.

SPARTA framework “is intended to provide unclassified information to space professionals about how spacecraft may be compromised via cyber means.”

SPARTA v1.3 delivers significant updates. You can find all relevant updates in this blog post.

SPARTA cyber-security framework defines and classifies the activities, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) implemented by malicious hackers, aimed at compromising the functionality and operation of both space vectors and satellite systems in orbit.

You can enter to the SPARTA portal here.

In v1.3, a new presentation from CySat 2023 has been posted here.

Video of the CYSAT 2023: Demo “Hacking Spacecraft using Space Attack Research and Tactic Analysis”

Demo by Brandon Bailey (SPARTA), Senior Cybersecurity Project Manager at The Aerospace Corporation.

What about SPARTA vs. ATT&CK MITRE ?

The current cyber-security frameworks – MITRE’s ATT&CK and Microsoft’s Kubernetes – while representing the industry standard for analyzing attacks on terrestrial devices, however, do not sufficiently cover the space segment scenarios.

What about SPARTA vs. SPACE-SHIELD ?

SPACE-SHIELD (Space Attacks and Countermeasures Engineering Shield) is an ATT&CK® like knowledge-base framework for Space Systems. It is a collection of adversary tactics and techniques, and a security tool applicable in the Space environment to strengthen the security level. The matrix covers the Space Segment and communication links, and it does not address specific types of mission. You can learn more about SPACE-SHIELD here.

Need to go futhermore MITRE ATT&CK framework ?

To go futhermore the concept of MITRE ATT&CK framework applied on specific domain, you can also have a look on the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix.

The MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix is an overview of the tactics and techniques described in the ATT&CK for ICS knowledge base. It visually aligns individual techniques under the tactics in which they can be applied.

The MITRE ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Source: https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Main_Page )

Below is the mapping of Stuxnet attack on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Than’ks to Airbus Cybersecurity). « Mapping Stuxnet to the ATT&CK for ICS matrix, as shown in figure 3, quickly shows how complex this attack was. Business risk owners can now identify which techniques to focus on if they need to minimise the risk from strikes like Stuxnet. »

Mapping of Stuxnet on the ATT&CK for ICS matrix (Source: https://airbus-cyber-security.com/mitre-attck-for-ics-everything-you-need-to-know/)

About Aerospace Corporation

Source : Linkedin Profile

The Aerospace Corporation has provided independent technical and scientific research, development, and advisory services to national-security space programs since 1960. We operate a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for the United States Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office and support all national-security space programs. We also apply more than 40 years of experience with space systems to projects for civil agencies like NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, commercial companies, universities, and some international organizations in the national interest.

From our inception, our highly skilled technical people have focused on ensuring the success of every mission and developing the most effective and economic space-related hardware and software in the world. Our insight and involvement in space programs has significantly reduced the risk of launch failure and increased both satellite endurance and performance. Avoiding a single catastrophic failure resulting in the loss of operational capabilities can save the government more than three times the total annual Aerospace FFRDC budget.

We don’t manufacture anything. Our greatest asset is the technical expertise of our people. Our involvement spans all facets of space systems: including systems engineering, testing, analysis, and development; acquisition support; launch readiness and certification; anomaly resolution; and the application of new technologies for existing and next-generation space systems. Our state-of-the-art laboratory facilities are staffed by some of the leading scientists in the world.

Aerospace Corporation’s website : aerospace.org

NIST released IR 8401, a new Cybersecurity Framework applied to the ground segment of space operations

By

François Quiquet

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30 April 2023

0

NIST released IR 8401, a new guidance named “Satellite Ground Segment: Applying the Cybersecurity Framework to Assure Satellite Command and Control”.

NIST IR 8401 is a Cybersecurity Framework for Addressing Satellite Cybersecurity to the Ground Segment of Space Operations

NIST recognizes the importance of the infrastructure that provides positioning, timing, and navigation (PNT) information to the scientific knowledge, economy, and security of the Nation. This infrastructure consists of three parts: the space segment, the ground segment, and the users of PNT.

Fig. 1. Satellite Ground Segment Components of Commercial Space Operations

NIST IR 8401, Satellite Ground Segment: Applying the Cybersecurity Framework to Assure Satellite Command and Control, applies the NIST CSF to the ground segment of space operations. The document defines the ground segment, outlines its responsibilities, and presents a mapping to relevant information references. The Profile defined in this report provides a flexible framework for managing risk and addresses the goals of Space Policy Directive 5 (SPD-5) for securing space.

Ground Segment is composed of Terminals, Mission Operation Centers and Payload Operation Centers as described in the figure below.

Fig. 2. Components In and Out of Scope for the Profile

Find below the Abstract of the IR 8401

Space operations are increasingly important to the national and economic security of the United States. Commercial space’s contribution to the critical infrastructure is growing in both volume and diversity of services, as illustrated by the increased use of commercial communications satellite (COMSAT) bandwidth, the purchase of commercial imagery, and the hosting of government payloads on commercial satellites. The U.S. Government recognizes and supports space resilience through numerous space policies, executive orders, and the National Cyber Strategy. The space cyber-ecosystem is an inherently risky, high-cost, and often inaccessible environment consisting of distinct yet interdependent segments. This report applies the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to the ground segment of space operations with an emphasis on the command and control of satellite buses and payloads.

Find below some Editor’s Note regarding NIST IR 8401

“This is intended as guidance, not a regulatory requirement, to raise the bar on the security of the ground-based components of satellite systems. They start with the basics: know what hardware you have, know what software is running, know what it is connected to and what your information protection requirements are. Each of the sections of the CSF (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover) include sub-categories you should review, including applicability and references to identify gaps or things you may not have considered.”

Lee Neely, senior IT and security professional at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)

“Since the NIST profile applies to ground segments of satellite systems, the guidance in NIST IR 8401 is pretty much the same as any guidance for any computer system. The key phrase in it is “Traditionally, ground segment isolation was accomplished through air gapping or limited connections. Increasingly, isolation is being accomplished via accounts, tenant isolation, and identities when using third-party services.” If you run, or are paying for, ground systems for satellite systems that are still claiming to be air gapped and no external connections, big red flags should be flapping.”

John Pescatore, Director of Emerging Security Trends

“Satellites and the ground stations that control them use the same IT and communication technologies found in other critical infrastructure. The threat is really about who can access the ground station, directly or via remote means. Not surprisingly, the same set of basic security safeguards need to be employed to protect this critical infrastructure.”

Curtis Dukes, CIS’s Executive Vice President and General Manager of the Best Practices and Automation Group

Community of Interest

The Approach used by NIST is to solicit Participation in a “Community Of Interest”, with about 130 Members representing over thirty organizations.

Satellite Vendors, Operators, Government, Academia,
Consultants, Private Individuals, Cloud Service Providers

Separate NISTIRs for Other Segments

In addition to the Ground Segment profile (NISTFR 8401), there are two other profiles already released :

Possible Future Profiles

NIST is working for possible future profiles as :

Launch Profile
Transfer Profile
IMINT Profile
Satellite Internet Service Provider Profile

More détails about NISTIR 8401

You can find more détails about NISTIR 8401 here.
Powerpoint presentation here.

Read more in

ESA released the SPACE-SHIELD, an ATT&CK® like knowledge-base framework for Space Systems

By

François Quiquet

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29 April 2023

0

I dreamed about it, ESA did it! ESA (European Space Agency) released the SPACE-SHIELD (Space Attacks and Countermeasures Engineering Shield). This is an ATT&CK® like knowledge-base framework for Space Systems.

This is a collection of adversary TTP (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) that are relevant for Space systems. As ESA said, the matrix is tailored on the Space Segment and communication links, and it does not address specific types of mission, maintaining a broad and general point of view.

ESA released this security tool to help Cyber and System security teams. It’s a complementary tool to the Cyber Threat Intelligence for Space in projects like SCCoE and CSOC.

This tool can address preliminary phases of projects to consider the security during the design and preliminary security assessment.

CSOC means Cyber and Security Operations Centre. The CSOC is part of ESA’s security strategy defined in ESA Agenda 2025 to increase the cyber resilience of all its activities and securely support its Member States and partners.

CSOC monitors, reacts and tracks relevant information and events with the objective of maintaining the overall security posture. The CSOC detects and reacts to security incidents and maintains the overall security posture of the organisation, supporting the
readiness of the organisation’s defensive capabilities.

SCCoE means Security Cyber Centre of Excellence. The SCCoE provides training, test & validation services, and centralisation of forensic services/expertise as well as developing a distributed risk analysis process capability.

The SCCoE, will work in synergy with the C-SOC, sharing security functionalities such as threat and vulnerabilities analysis tools and complementing capacity of the C-SOC such as the security functionalities to analyse a complex system in a synthetic cyber threat scenario in order to investigate potential security vulnerabilities.

The CSOC and SCCoE are located at European Space Security and Education Centre (ESEC) at Redu, Belgium, the ESA centre of excellence for cyber security.

More information about the SPACE-SHIELD here.

Thales prepares to secure European infrastructures against attacks from future quantum computers

By

François Quiquet

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29 April 2023

0

14 April 2023, Paris, La Défense (Press Release)

As a driving force in the second quantum revolution, Thales has joined forces with around twenty deep tech, academic and industry partners, as part of the EuroQCI initiative (European Quantum Communication Infrastructure), which aims to deploy a quantum communication infrastructure for EU member states within three years.

By 2040, quantum computers could use their unprecedented computational power to decode encrypted data, incomparably threatening the security of even the best-protected communication systems. EuroQCI aims to counter that threat by developing sovereign systems to protect the communications and data assets of critical infrastructure providers and government institutions.

The longer-term objective is to create a Quantum Information Network (QIN) that will harness the phenomenon of quantum entanglement not only to guarantee communications security but also to create networks of quantum sensors and processors, which have the potential to drive exponential increases in the already outstanding performance of quantum sensors and quantum computers.

As part of this effort, Thales is breaking new ground as a member of multiple new consortia that have been set up since late 2022 in the following fields:

Quantum repeaters, with the Delft University: QIA (Quantum Internet Alliance) – led by the Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands – is working to demonstrate the feasibility of connecting users in two metropolitan areas 500 km apart, using quantum repeaters, which can compensate for the loss of information via a quantum memory;
Quantum key distribution: QKISS – coordinated by Exail – and QUARTER – led by LuxQuanta – are developing Quantum Key Distribution systems to protect users’ critical communications from cyberattacks.
Certification of quantum communication: PETRUS – led by Deutsche Telekom – is the official coordinator of 32 EuroQCI projects, on behalf of the European Commission. It is also developing a framework for certification and accreditation of quantum communication products and networks.
Satellite quantum communications: TeQuantS – led by Thales Alenia Space – aims to develop quantum space-to-Earth communications technologies, necessary for cybersecurity applications and future quantum information networks, through the construction of satellites and optical ground stations by the end of 2026.

Specifically, the Thales teams taking part in these projects are working to develop quantum key generation, distribution and management equipment and the associated communication encryption devices, as well as defining the architecture of these quantum communication infrastructures.

Thales operates the largest quantum physics research facilities in Europe, in partnership with the CNRS, and some 100 engineers and researchers are currently engaged in the development of the quantum solutions (sensors, communications and algorithms) that will play a foundational role in tomorrow’s world. These new consortia will all benefit from Thales’s multi-disciplinary expertise, in particular in the field of secure communication networks.

Thales veut développer l’Internet quantique via satellite

By

François Quiquet

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29 April 2023

0

Marko Erman, le directeur scientifique de Thales, est intervenu dans l’émission Tech&Co de BFM Business, sur le thème de l’Internet quantique via satellite.

Dans cet entretien, il aborde l’inviolabilité de la clé de chiffrement, la distribution quantique des clés et la cybersécurité des communications quantiques par satellite.

L’occasion, pour nous, de revenir et d’approfondir les différentes notions abordées dans cet entretien.

Inviolabilité de la clé de chiffrement

La cryptographie quantique consiste à générer et partager des clés de chiffrement basés non pas sur des lois mathématiques mais sur des lois de la mécanique quantique.

La sécurité de la cryptographie quantique ne repose plus sur la difficulté mathématique d’un problème, comme c’est le cas des protocoles cryptographiques utilisés aujourd’hui mais sur une propriété de la physique quantique qu’on appelle l’effondrement de la fonction d’onde ou réduction du paquet d’onde.

On vous explique un peu plus ce concept ci-dessous.

En cryptographie quantique, on extrait une clé de chiffrement classique symétrique (des 0 et des 1 dans le désordre) à partir d’échange de qubits photoniques. Mais à la fin, on manipule bien une clé de chiffrement classique.

Imaginons maintenant qu’une particule, un peu comme un interrupteur, admette deux états possibles, que nous baptiserons 1 et 0 pour un maximum de simplicité. Si l’on en croit l’interprétation de Copenhague, tandis qu’un interrupteur ne peut être que dans un seul état à la fois (allumé ou éteint), la particule, elle, se trouve dans ce que l’on appelle une superposition d’états, c’est-à-dire à la fois 1 et 0.

Dans le monde quantique, le simple fait d’observer un système quantique provoque une sorte d’effondrement vers un état spécifique. On parle aussi de réduction du paquet d’onde.

Ainsi, une particule qui, selon la théorie, peut se trouver dans plusieurs états à la fois, choisit instantanément son camp dès qu’elle est observée.

Supposons, qu’un observateur décide de mesurer l’état quantique pour récupérer la clé de chiffrement, alors le simple fait d’observer et de mesurer l’état quantique provoque la disparition de la superposition quantique, causant ainsi un effondrement de la fonction d’onde.

Une fois la première observation faite, l’effondrement de la fonction d’onde est absolu est définitif, il n’y a pas de versions alternatives ou de modifications possibles. Il est donc impossible de récupérer la clé de chiffrement.

Pour être plus précis, l’observation ou la mesure d’un état quantique ne le fait pas réellement disparaître. Au lieu de cela, la mesure d’un état quantique perturbe plutôt l’état du système mesuré et modifie sa fonction d’onde. C’est tette perturbation qu’on appelle l’effondrement de la fonction d’onde et elle est un phénomène central de la mécanique quantique.

source : futura-sciences.com et Wikipedia

Les différentes formes de distribution quantiques des clés

Dans la théorie, il existe deux grandes formes de QKD : celle qui repose sur le protocole BB84 et dérivés qui n’exploite que l’effondrement de la fonction d’onde, et celle qui repose sur l’intrication (depuis le protocole E91). Elles ont des caractéristiques différentes.

Aujourd’hui, ce qui est déjà déployé, ce sont des BB84-like comme en Chine. Le projet Européen vise, quant à lui, à faire de la QKD intriquée. Son intérêt est que, seule la QKD intriquée permet de bâtir un Internet quantique et de relier quantiquement des objets quantiques (ordinateurs ou capteurs). Le protocole BB84 ne le permet pas. Par contre, l’Internet quantique a besoin de répéteurs d’intrication qui sont en cours de développement.

Dans la suite de cet article, nous ne parlerons que de QKD qui repose sur l’intrication (depuis le protocole E91)

La distribution quantique des clés de chiffrement

Ici, nous allons parler d’une distribution quantique des clés de chiffrement basée sur l’intrication (depuis le protocole E91).

Dans des communications sécurisées par cryptographie quantique, la distribution quantique des clés de chiffrement s’appuie sur des satellites qui font office de relais de sécurité intermédiaires.

En cryptographie quantique, la distribution quantiques de clés ou QKD pour Quantum Key Distribution, est un moyen sûr de partager des clés secrètes entre des utilisateurs distants.

L’utilisation de relais par satellite permet d’étendre les distances de communication mais ces relais posent des risques de sécurité. Ce problème peut être résolu en utilisant une QKD basée sur l’intrication.

En effet, la physique quantique rend possible un effet étrange appelé l’intrication. Plus concrètement, deux ou plusieurs particules telles que des photons qui sont liés ou « enchevêtrés » peuvent s’influencer simultanément, quelle que soit leur distance.

Représentation d’artiste de l’intrication (Crédits : Arhan Amun Ankh)

Des paires de photons intriqués peuvent être distribuées via des liaisons satellites descendantes vers des observatoires terrestres. Cette méthode décuple non seulement la distance de sécurité au sol, mais augmente également la sécurité pratique de QKD grâce à l’intrication.

Comme on l’a vu précédemment, la sécurité des protocoles d’échange quantique de clé est appuyée sur l’hypothèse que le théorème de non clonage prive un adversaire d’apprendre l’état d’une particule avant la mesure.

Pour comprendre la distribution quantique de clés

Pour comprendre la distribution quantique de clés de chiffrement, je vous conseille cette vidéo

Pour comprendre l’intrication quantique

Pour comprendre l’intrication quantique, je vous conseille la vidéo de Science Étonnante sur le sujet

La cybersécurité des communications quantiques par satellite

Jusqu’à aujourd’hui, la distribution quantique des clés (QKD) était principalement menée à travers des fibres optiques au sol. La distance maximale atteinte jusqu’à maintenant pour générer des clés de cryptographie a été réalisée en laboratoire sur une fibre optique enroulée sur 830 kilomètres de long (Source : Twin-field quantum key distribution over 830-km fibre by Shuang Wang et al, Nature, January 2022).

L’utilisation de relais satellites permet d’étendre ces distances et les problèmes de sécurité sont résolus en utilisant une distribution quantique des clés (QKD) basée sur l’intrication.

Cette technologie basée sur l’inviolabilité de la clé de chiffrement, permet de réaliser des communications sécurisées par satellite.

L’ENISA, l’agence de l’Union européenne pour la cybersécurité, a publié un papier pour expliquer ce qu’est et ce que n’est pas la QKD. C’est un papier qui date de novembre 2009 donc plusieurs problèmes évoquées ont été résous depuis ou sont en cours de résolution.

La sécurisation des infrastructures européennes face aux attaques des futurs ordinateurs quantiques

Au cœur de la seconde révolution quantique, Thales s’associe à une vingtaine de partenaires de la « deeptech », acteurs académiques et industriels, afin de déployer d’ici 3 ans une infrastructure résiliente et ultra-sécurisée de communications quantiques pour les Etats membres de l’Union Européenne, via l’initiative EuroQCI (European Quantum Communication Infrastructure).

l’objectif est de créer un réseau d’information quantique appelé QIN, Quantum Information Network. Il permettra non seulement la sécurisation des communications, mais également la mise en réseau de capteurs et de processeurs quantiques, qui permettront de centupler les performances déjà exceptionnelles des capteurs quantiques et ordinateurs quantiques.

Pour en savoir plus, voir notre article sur le sujet ici.

Pour en savoir plus sur le quantique et la cryptographie quantique

On vous propose ci-dessous plusieurs ressources à consulter pour approfondir le sujet du quantique, la cryptographie quantique et le chiffrement post-quantique

Concernant les technologies quantiques en général, je vous conseille le blog d’Oliver Ezratty. Vous pourrez écouter Quantum, le podcast mensuel de l’actualité quantique francophone, enregistré en compagnie de Fanny Bouton, quantum lead chez OVHcloud. Vous pourrez également y télécharger l’ebook Understanding Quantum Technologies, cinquième édition, publiée en septembre 2022, 1128 pages. C’est la mise à jour de la quatrième édition, toujours en anglais et sans version française. C’est une véritable bible publique sur le sujet de la physique quantique. Une version simplifiée de 24 pages est aussi disponible. Les ebook d’Oliver Ezratty sont tous gratuits et téléchargeables sur son blog au format PDF en général et parfois en ePub.
Je vous conseille également l’une des chroniques de Michel Juvin, publiée chez Alliancy – le mag numérique et business dans « Les Carnets de Michel » sur le sujet du chiffrement post-quantique. Michel Juvin est un expert de la sécurité et de la transformation, ancien membre actif du CESIN (Club des Experts de la Sécurité de l’Information et du Numérique), ancien DSI puis Chief Information Security Officier (CISO), notamment dans des entreprises comme Lafarge ou Chanel. Michel partage régulièrement sa vieille technologique et le fruit de ses réflexions sur ce monde hyper technique.

Feuille de route sur le développement des réseaux d’information quantique par satellite

Thales Alenia Space, en tant que maître d’œuvre de l’étude, associé au CNES (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales) et au CNRS (Centre national de la recherche scientifique), a publié un document qui présente une feuille de route sur le développement des réseaux d’information quantique (QIN) par satellite.

Titre du document

Satellite-based quantum information networks: use cases, architecture, and roadmap, de Forges de Parny, L., Alibart, O., Debaud, J. et al. Satellite-based quantum information networks: use cases, architecture, and roadmap. Commun Phys 6, 12 (2023).

Résumé du document

Les réseaux d’information quantique (QIN) suscitent un intérêt croissant, car ils permettent de connecter des dispositifs quantiques sur de longues distances, améliorant ainsi considérablement leurs capacités intrinsèques de calcul, de détection et de sécurité. Le mécanisme central d’un QIN est la téléportation d’états quantiques, consommant de l’intrication quantique, qui peut être considérée dans ce contexte comme un nouveau type de ressource réseau. Nous identifions ici les cas d’utilisation par secteur d’activité, y compris les objectifs de performance clés, en tant que référence pour les exigences du réseau. Nous définissons ensuite l’architecture de haut niveau d’un QIN générique, avant de nous concentrer sur l’architecture du segment spatial, dans le but d’identifier les principaux moteurs de conception et les éléments critiques. Une étude de l’état de l’art de ces éléments critiques est présentée, ainsi que les questions liées à la normalisation. Enfin, nous expliquons notre feuille de route pour le développement des premiers QIN et détaillons la première étape déjà achevée, à savoir la conception et la simulation numérique des QIN. la conception et la simulation numérique d’un démonstrateur de distribution d’intrication espace-sol. de distribution d’enchevêtrement.

Thales seizes control of ESA demonstration satellite in first cybersecurity exercise of its kind

By

François Quiquet

-

29 April 2023

0

25 April 2023, Paris,

For the third edition of CYSAT, the European event entirely dedicated to cybersecurity for the space industry, taking place on 26-27 April 2023 at Station F in Paris, the European Space Agency (ESA) set up a satellite test bench to simulate attempts to seize control of OPS-SAT, a nanosatellite operated by the agency for demonstration purposes.
Thales’s offensive cybersecurity team stepped up to the challenge, identifying vulnerabilities that could enable malicious actors to disrupt operation of the ESA satellite.
The results of the ethical satellite hacking exercise, the first of its kind in the world, will be used to tighten security for the satellite and its onboard applications, helping to improve the cyber resilience of space systems, protect sensitive data and support the long-term success of space programmes.

Artist’s impression of OPS-SAT. Credit: ESA – European Space Agency

The European Space Agency (ESA) challenged cybersecurity experts in the space industry ecosystem to disrupt the operation of the agency’s OPS-SAT demonstration nanosatellite. Participants used a variety of ethical hacking techniques to take control of the system used to manage the payload’s global positioning system, attitude control system (1) and onboard camera. Unauthorised access to these systems can cause serious damage to the satellite or lead to a loss of control over its mission. Thales’s offensive cybersecurity team worked with the Group’s Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility, ITSEF (2), for this unique exercise, which demonstrates the need for a high level of cyber resilience in the very specific operating environment of space.

The Thales team of four cybersecurity researchers accessed the satellite’s onboard system, used standard access rights to gain control of its application environment, and then exploited several vulnerabilities to introduce malicious code into the satellite’s systems. This made it possible to compromise the data sent back to Earth, in particular by modifying the images captured by the satellite’s camera, and to achieve other objectives such as masking selected geographic areas in the satellite imagery while concealing their activities to avoid detection by ESA. The demonstration was organised specifically for CYSAT to help assess the potential impact of a real cyberattack and the consequences for civilian systems.

Throughout the exercise, ESA had access to the satellite’s systems to retain control and ensure a return to normal operation.

Thales is grateful to ESA and the CYSAT organisers for providing this unique opportunity to demonstrate the ability of our experts to identify vulnerabilities in a satellite system. With the growing number of military as well as civil applications that are reliant on satellite systems today, the space industry needs to take cybersecurity into account at every stage in the satellite’s life cycle, from initial design to systems development and maintenance. This unprecedented exercise was a chance to raise awareness of potential flaws and vulnerabilities so that they can be remediated more effectively, and to adapt current and future solutions to improve the cyber resilience of satellites and space programmes in general, including both ground segments and orbital systems.

Pierre-Yves Jolivet, VP Cyber Solutions, Thales.

In a presentation on 27 April by Thales experts and members of the ESA team, CYSAT participants can find out more about the attack scenario used in this first demonstration of offensive cybersecurity techniques, tactics and procedures.

Thales’s cybersecurity capabilities for the space industry

Drawing on more than 40 years of experience in cybersecurity and space activities, Thales applies the principles of “cybersecurity by design” to the products it develops for satellite operators and space agencies. Its joint venture with Leonardo, Thales Alenia Space, designs and delivers innovative solutions for telecommunications, navigation, Earth observation, environmental monitoring, space exploration, scientific research and orbital infrastructures. With more than 3,500 cybersecurity specialists, Thales helps to ensure the security of satellite systems for national and European space programmes – in particular Europe’s Galileo satellite navigation programme – and at the international level. With its combined expertise in cutting-edge satellite systems and cybersecurity solutions relying on the latest military technologies, Thales offers governments, institutions and enterprise customers a comprehensive range of cybersecurity solutions to guarantee robust protection of all the elements of a space system. The offensive cybersecurity capabilities demonstrated by Thales at CYSAT enable customers to better anticipate and respond to current and future threats. The Group’s cybersecurity solutions for the space industry encompass everything from risk and threat evaluation to data protection and network security, incident detection and response, and security maintenance throughout the system life cycle.

(1) The attitude of a satellite refers to its orientation or position relative to a reference frame, which is usually the Earth. Specifically, it describes the satellite’s three-dimensional orientation with respect to three perpendicular axes: roll, pitch, and yaw.

(2) An Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) is a trusted, independent third-party product security testing facility accredited by a national certification body (ANSSI in France).

About Thales

Thales (Euronext Paris: HO) is a global leader in advanced technologies within three domains: Defence & Security, Aeronautics & Space, and Digital Identity & Security. It develops products and solutions that help make the world safer, greener and more inclusive.

The Group invests close to €4 billion a year in Research & Development, particularly in key areas such as quantum technologies, Edge computing, 6G and cybersecurity.

Thales has 77,000 (1) employees in 68 countries. In 2022, the Group generated sales of €17.6 billion.

(1) These figures do not include the Transportation business, which is currently being divested.

More information:

CYSAT: The leading European cybersecurity and space exhibition to take place 26th-27th April in Paris (Station F)

By

François Quiquet

-

20 April 2023

0

The biggest European event entirely focused on cybersecurity for the space industry will take place in Paris in April 2023. Since 2021, the event brings space and cybersecurity experts together to create a European ecosystem capable of responding to the current and future challenges faced by the European space industry

Paris, 10th March 2023 – CYSEC, a leading cybersecurity company, is organising the third edition of CYSAT, the largest European event entirely dedicated to cybersecurity for the space industry, on 26th and 27th April 2023 at Station F in Paris.

Faced with cybersecurity challenges and the growing importance of data protection in space, it is crucial to bring together communities of cybersecurity experts to build a European ecosystem capable of addressing current and future industry challenges.

Last years’ event saw more than 450 space specialists, decision-makers and experts come together. In its third year, CYSAT will highlight Europe’s cybersecurity capabilities and solutions dedicated to space from both a technological and geostrategic perspective.

What to expect at the event:

An exclusive testimony by Colonel Oleksandr Potii, Deputy Chairman of the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine. A year since the cyber-attack on satellite network KA-SAT, Potii will reflect on what lessons can be learned from this attack.
Talks and keynotes from renowned industry experts, including Philippe Baptiste, President of CNES, Jean-Marc Nasr, Vice-President Space at Airbus Defence and Space, Massimo Mercati, Head of Security at ESA and Greg Wyler, founder of E-Space.

Workshops and demonstrations highlighting the know-how of the space industry

Mathieu Bailly, VP Space at CYSEC and Director of CYSAT said: “Last years’ CYSAT event focused on the importance and critical value of space data, in a particularly charged geopolitical context. Data protection has proven to be a major issue for both companies and European countries in recent times. This year, we want to bring the major players in space and cybersecurity together again, with the aim to create a sovereign European ecosystem, capable of addressing these technological and economic challenges.

“We hope to foster a continuum between established players and newcomers in the space industry to demonstrate Europe’s capacity for innovation and the opportunities this new ecosystem will create.”

To find the full programme and more information on the event, visit: https://cysat.eu/

A propos de CYSEC

CYSEC is a Franco-Swiss cybersecurity company that is a pioneer in the protection of satellites and data collected and transmitted in space.

The company has just launched two security products in 2023, ARCA SATCOM dedicated to the satellite internet market, and ARCA SATLINK dedicated to constellation operators.

For more information : www.cysec.com

Space Cybersecurity Weekly Watch by CyberInflight – W15 2023

By

François Quiquet

-

13 April 2023

0

CyberInflight and Florent Rizzo released their new Space Cybersecurity Weekly Watch for week 15 (April 3-11, 2023)

In this second Space Cybersecurity Watch, you will find Articles, company’s communications, whitepapers, academic works, podcast, and sources not to be missed on the topic of space cybersecurity over a specified timeframe.

The areas covered by this watch are : geopolitic, market & competition, threat intelligence, regulation, technology, training & education, important news.

You can download this second Space Cybersecurity Weekly Watch here.

HOT NEWS

At the top of their watch, CyberInflight and Florent Rizzo make a very important announcement :

“CyberInflight new space cybersecurity market intelligence research report is out ! The team has put an incredible amount of effort to release this “150-pages bible of the space cybersecurity market” ! You can get the details and the table of content contacting us. This report is a unique resource that identifies the main market trends and intelligence indicators to comprehend the overall space cybersecurity ecosystem and to make better strategic decision making.”

Congratulations to all CyberInflight team for this achievement.

You can check a sample here.

Time to Designate Space Systems as Critical Infrastructure

Find below the Executive Summary of the report

This report does some recommendations for Congress

The space systems threat spectrum

Find below the full report

More about CSC 2.0

Inviolabilité de la clé de chiffrement

Les différentes formes de distribution quantiques des clés

La distribution quantique des clés de chiffrement

Pour comprendre la distribution quantique de clés

Pour comprendre l’intrication quantique

La cybersécurité des communications quantiques par satellite

La sécurisation des infrastructures européennes face aux attaques des futurs ordinateurs quantiques

Pour en savoir plus sur le quantique et la cryptographie quantique

Feuille de route sur le développement des réseaux d’information quantique par satellite

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